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Introduction 
 
The Australian Centre for Intellectual Property in Agriculture (ACIPA) is a research 
centre based at the law schools of the Australian National University in Canberra and 
Griffith University in Brisbane.  It commenced operations in September 2000 to 
undertake research in issues relating to intellectual property law, and apply that 
knowledge to the scientific community and industry and rural bodies. The Centre's 
ultimate purpose is to foster an active environment in which Australia better protects and 
capitalises the products of research and innovation.    
 
As part of its policy activities, ACIPA hosted a symposium, "Freedom To Tinker:  Patent 
Law and Scientific Research", on the 19th March 2004.  This symposium considered 
whether Australian patent law should have a defence for research use, and, if so, what its 
scope should be.  It explored the impact of such an exemption upon a number of 
important industries - such as agriculture, biotechnology, health care, and information 
technology.  It also examined the repercussions of such a defence for universities, 
research organisations, and educational institutions. 
 
Strikingly, there has a great deal of consensus amongst the government speakers at the 
symposium.  Mr Brian Opeskin discussed the proposals of the Australian Law Reform 
Commission from the Discussion Paper, Gene Patenting and Human Health.  The 
Commission has proposed that the Australian Government should recognise a defence for 
experimental and research use to facilitate access to both genetic technologies and stem 
cell research: 
 
The ALRC has concluded that it is desirable to remove uncertainty about the existence and scope 
of an experimental use defence in Australian law. Such a reform received broad support in 
submissions. The existing uncertainty is unhelpful to the research community and commercial 
organisations. It has the potential to lead to under-investment in basic research and hinder 
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innovation because researchers are concerned that their activities may lead to legal action by 
patent holders.1 
 
The Commission rejects the narrow, procrustean view of the research exemption adopted 
by the United States Court of Appeals in Madey v Duke University, which held that the 
defence was limited to actions performed "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for 
strictly philosophical inquiry".2  It maintains that a statutory defence should be broadly 
based, and resemble the law of the United Kingdom and other member states of the 
European Union.  It notes:  "Moreover, basing a new defence on the European Union 
model would promote harmonisation of Australian patent law with the law of a major 
trading bloc, and would give Australian courts the benefit of considering European case 
law in applying the new provisions".3 
 
Mr Doug Waterhouse, the registrar of the Plant Breeders' Rights Office, also supported 
the introduction of a research exemption in the patent system.  He emphasized that a 
research exemption in relation to plant breeder's rights had been in operation in Australia 
for the last seventeen years.  S 16 of the Plant Breeder's Rights Act 1994 (Cth) provided 
"any act done in relation to a plant variety covered by plant breeder's rights that is done:  
(a) privately and for non-commercial purposes; or (b) for experimental purposes; or (c) 
for the purpose of breeding other plant varieties; does not infringe the plant breeder's 
rights".  Mr Doug Waterhouse maintained that there should be a defence for experimental 
use in both plant breeder's rights and patent law for reasons of harmony and equivalence. 
 
The other speakers provided an insight into the impact of the research exemption upon 
particular industries.  Mr Geoff Budd, Counsel for the Grains Research and Development 
Corporation, was supportive of the creation of a research exemption from the perspective 
of the research and development community.  Professor Simon Easteal of the Human 
Genetics Group at the John Curtin School of Medical Research in the Australian National 
                                                 
1  Australian Law Reform Commission.  Gene Patenting and Human Health.  Discussion Paper 68.  
Sydney:  Australian Law Reform Commission, February 2004, p 407-408. 
2  Madey v. Duke University (2002) 307 F.3d 1351. 
3  Australian Law Reform Commission.  Gene Patenting and Human Health.  Discussion Paper 68.  
Sydney:  Australian Law Reform Commission, February 2004, p. 410 
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University, and the Scientific Advisory Committee of Genetic Technologies Limited was 
not inclined to support a broad based research exemption.  He emphasized the need for 
better licensing practices and digital rights management.  Dr Thomas Faunce, a Lecturer 
at the Faculty of Law and the Medical School of the Australian National University was 
concerned about the impact of the United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement.  Ms 
Miranda Lee, the Executive Officer of the Australian Digital Alliance discussed the 
relevance of a research exemption in the field of information technology. 
 
In light of this symposium, ACIPA welcomes the opportunity to make a submission to 
the Advisory Council on Intellectual Property issues paper, "Patents And Experimental 
Use".  It is concerned that there is great uncertainty whether researchers can rely upon a 
defence for experimental use.  ACIPA recommends that the Commonwealth should 
amend the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) to establish a new defence to a claim of patent 
infringement based on the use of a patented invention to study or experiment on the 
subject matter of the invention; for example, to investigate its properties or improve upon 
it. The legislation should make it clear that the existence of a commercial purpose or 
intention does not affect the availability of the defence.  ACIPA believes that such a 
research exemption is in keeping with our international obligations.  Indeed, it is of the 
opinion that a defence for experimental use is compatible both with the TRIPS 
Agreement of the World Trade Organization and the recently concluded United States-
Australia Free Trade Agreement. 
 
ACIPA maintains that a defence for experimental use is a unique policy reform - because 
it would enable researchers to use a patented invention without either seeking permission 
from the patent owner or paying royalties.  It can be distinguished by these characteristics 
from a number of other policy options.  Thus, licensing, patent pools, and open source 
licensing depend very much up the patent holder providing permission for an invention to 
be shared in that way.  Furthermore, compulsory licensing can compel a patent holder to 
give access to patented inventions - but the user is still obliged to pay royalties.  
Nonetheless, ACIPA observes that a defence for experimental use can be supplemented 
by additional reforms to patent law.  The threshold patent criteria of novelty and 
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inventive step could be tightened, in line with the dissenting judgment of Justice Kirby in 
Aktiebolaget Hassle v Alphapharm Pty Limited.4  The compulsory licensing provisions in 
the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) need to be modernised to reflect contemporary concerns about 
competition policy.  There should be greater use of creative licensing, patent pooling, and 
open source licensing to share patented technology.  However, none of such reforms 
could be considered to be a substitute for the recognition of a defence of experimental 
use. 
                                                 
4  Aktiebolaget Hassle v Alphapharm Pty Limited [2002] HCA 59 
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Question 1 
(a) What is your understanding of current law on an experimental use exemption in 
Australia? 
(b) What is the basis of this understanding and how certain are you of it? 
(c) How has your understanding affected your research and development behaviour? 
 
In Australia, there has been great uncertainty whether researchers can rely upon a defence 
for experimental use. 
 
Some speculate that such a defence can be inferred from old English case law.  In 
Frearson v Loe, Jessel MR stated that "if a man makes things merely by way of bona fide 
experiment...  that is not an invasion of the exclusive rights granted by the patent". 5 
 
In New York University v Nissin Molecular Biology Institute Inc, a delegate of the 
Commissioner of Patents relied upon the case of Frearson v Loe in interpreting the words 
"experimental purposes" in regulation 3.25 (4) of the Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth).6  
This provision addresses the uses that a third-party may make of a sample of a micro-
organism deposited under the Budapest Treaty; it does not provide a defence to a claim of 
infringement.  The Commissioner's delegate indicated that the term "experimental 
purposes" should be construed analogously too those experimental uses that do not give 
rise to an infringement of a patent.   
 
Others argue that an implied experimental use defence may exist in Australian law, as it 
does in other common law jurisdictions. An experimental use defence might also be 
inferred from s 9 of the Patents Act, which excludes use ‘for the purpose of reasonable 
trial or experiment’ from the definition of ‘secret use’7. It could be argued that the patent 
holder should not be able to later claim that trial and experimentation by others during the 
                                                 
5  Frearson v Loe (1876) 9 ChD 48. 
6  New York University v Nissin Molecular Biology Institute Inc. (1994) 29 IPR 173 
7  Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 9(a), 18(1)(d). 
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life of the patent amounts to infringement of the holder’s exclusive rights8. However, 
such an argument is difficult to make because the purpose and the nature of the 
experiments that an alleged infringer might want to conduct will be different from those 
of a prospective patent holder. 
 
Despite an assumption that the experimental use exception applies in Australia, the 
evidence that Australian law recognizes research use as a defence is equivocal.9 This 
uncertainty in the law has implications for all relevant actors, including researchers who 
re-define, or “self-define”10 the scope of their potential research activity. The defence is 
used to the boundaries of their research until it becomes commercial venture. 
 
There is no express defence of research or experimental use of patented inventions from 
liability for infringement in the Patents Act 1990 (Cth).  It would seem there is no 
compelling precedent or statutory direction that provides for a defence of experimental 
use. 
                                                 
8  Smith, C. ‘Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Where Does Australia Stand?’ 
(2003) 53 Intellectual Property Forum 14, 15. 
9 Opeskin, B. Inventions, Patents and Research. Paper presented to ‘Freedom to Tinker: Patent Law 
and Scientific Research Symposium’, ACIPA, Canberra, 19 March 2004. 
10 Ibid. 
 8
Question 2: What lessons, if any, do overseas experience and law hold for an 
experimental use exemption in Australia? In particular, are any of the overseas 
approaches to be preferred for Australia? 
 
Overseas, there has been much debate about the boundaries of the defence for 
experimental use. 
 
In the case of Madey v Duke University, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit denied that the experimental use defence inoculated uses that were solely 
for research, academic or experimental purposes.11   It held that the defence was very 
narrow and was limited to actions performed "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or 
for strictly philosophical inquiry".  The Court of Appeals stressed that the defence did not 
immunize any commercial use or conduct that is in keeping with the alleged infringer's 
legitimate business.  Accordingly, it found that the educational institution Duke 
University could not rely upon the defence because the projects "further the institution's 
business objectives, including educating and enlightening students and faculty".  The 
Supreme Court of the United States refused to hear an appeal against the decision of the 
Court of Appeals. 
 
In the case of Integra Lifesciences I Ltd. v Merck, there was further discussion of the 
scope of experimental use defence in the United States.12  In this case, the owner of 
patents for a pharmacologically useful peptide sued competitors for patent infringement.  
In dissent, Pauline Newman held: 
 
The majority's prohibition of all research into patented subject matter is as impractical as it is 
incorrect.  The information contained in patents is a major source of scientific as well as 
technologic knowledge.  Indeed, in many areas of technology, technical information is not 
published outside of patent documents.  A rule that this information cannot be investigated without 
                                                 
11  Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
12  Integra Lifesciences Ltd v Merck KgaA  (2003) 331 F. 3d 860. 
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permission of the patentee is belied by the routine appearance of improvements on patented 
subject matter, as well as the rapid evolution of improvements on concepts that are patented. 13 
 
There was sharp criticism in her judgment of the decision in Madey v Duke University. 
 
The decision of the Court of Appeals in Madey v Duke University has been widely 
criticised in public debate. Professor Rebecca Eisenberg notes:  "Although the Madey 
decision did not extinguish the experimental use defense entirely, it eviscerated it to the 
point that it is essentially useless to research universities".14 She comments that the 
"seemingly disingenuous opinion… neither conforms to the implications of precedent nor 
explains the reasons for steering the law in a different direction but pretends that prior 
courts never meant to give research science special treatment".15  Eisenberg concludes:  
"Perhaps the experimental use defense could have evolved on a case-by-case basis as a 
tool for mediating between the private interests of patent owners and the public interest in 
unfettered scientific progress, but the Federal Circuit has shown no appetite for such a 
nuanced role.  If universities are unhappy with the current state of the law, they may need 
to go to Congress to fix it".16 
 
In an opinion, Dr Tim Sampson considers the application of the common law 
"experimental use defence" in light of economic theory.17 He draws upon the work of 
Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations, the famous economic text which was 
contemporaneous with the first case on the experimental use defence, Whittemore v 
Cutter.18  Sampson argues that "the decisions in Madey and Integra are, in reality, 
divorced from general economic considerations and as such their possible but unintended 
impact will be a general impoverishment of patentees and the beggaring of fundamental 
                                                 
13  Ibid. 
14  Eisenberg, R.  "Patent Swords And Shields", Science, 14 February 2003, Vol. 299, p. 1018-1019. 
15  Ibid. 
16  Ibid. 
17  Sampson, T.  "Madey, Integra And The Wealth Of Nations", European Intellectual Property 
Review, 2004, Vol. 26 (1), p. 1-6. 
18  Whittemore v Cutter (1813) 29 F. Cas 1120. 
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research, whether carried out in US universities or elsewhere".19   He observes:  "It 
would, at least in the opinion of the author, have been better for the United States to 
adopt the European approach to experimental use, which seeks to strike a balance 
between the non-commercial and commercial phases of research".20  Sampson concludes 
with a Shakespearean allusion that as "the short sighted patent proprietors now howling 
for the end of the common law defence, should have remembered that 'consuming means 
soon preys upon itself'".21 
 
The Federal Trade Commission was critical of the decision of the Federal Court in Madey 
v Duke University in its recent report: 
 
The Federal Circuit’s ruling in Madey v. Duke University has a potential to upset the equilibrium 
regarding research uses of patented inventions and may heighten any problems raised by 
uncertainty over the reach of the experimental use defense. This warrants continued attention as 
the implications of these recent developments in the law become better understood.22 
 
In its workshops, the Federal Trade Commission considered three scenarios in relation to 
the scope of the research exemption.  One involved research on a patented invention to 
see how or if it works.  Panelists generally supported a research exemption for this 
purpose.  A second scenario involved research to improve a patented invention, either 
creating a blocking situation (in which both the initial and the follow-on innovator need 
licenses to use the other’s invention) or designing around the initial patent.  Panelists 
expressed a range of views – from support through uncertainty and doubt – whether this 
research should be exempted.  Third, there is the possibility of using a patented item as a 
research tool to create an unrelated product. Panelists generally voiced objections to 
exempting patented items produced for use by researchers. 
 
                                                 
19  Sampson, T.  "Madey, Integra And The Wealth Of Nations", European Intellectual Property 
Review, 2004, Vol. 26 (1), p 1. 
20  Id, p 6. 
21  Id, p 6. 
22  Federal Trade Commission.  To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and 
Patent Law and Policy, A Report by the Federal Trade Commission, October 2003, p 37, 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf  
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Michigan Democrat Congresswoman, Lynn Rivers, has introduced legislation into the 
House of Representatives of the Congress aimed at preserving research innovation, and 
quality patient care in the field of genetic testing.  She declared:  "Evidence is mounting 
that the patenting of human genes is both inhibiting important biomedical research and 
interfering with patent care".23 
 
The Genomic Research And Diagnostic Accessibility Act 2002 (US) HR 3697  has three 
major provisions.  Section 2 exempts from patent infringement those individuals who use 
patented genetic sequence information for non-commercial research purposes. Section 3 
would exempt medical practitioners utilising genetic diagnostic tests from patent 
infringement remedies.  This section builds on an existing legislative reform in the United 
States which exempts health care providers from patent infringement suits when they use 
a patented medical or surgical procedure.24  Such a measure was put in place after an 
uproar over the case of Pallin v Singer,25 in which an eye surgeon was sued for patent 
infringement in respect of a surgical procedure.  Section 4 of the bill would require public 
disclosure of genomic sequence information contained within a patent application when 
public funds were used in the development of the invention.  
 
The Genomic Science And Technology Innovation Act 2002 (US) HR 3966 calls for an in-
depth study by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy on the impact 
of Federal patent policies on the rate of innovation, the cost, and the availability of 
genomic technologies. 
 
However, biotechnology firms are hostile to the introduction of the two bills into 
Congress. Rochelle Seide and Michelle Seide from the law firm Baker Bolts complain:  
"If enacted, each of these [bills] would threaten future biotech innovation in the United 
                                                 
23  Rivers, L. "Introduction Of The Genomic Research And Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002 H.R. 
3967 and The Genomic Science And Technology Innovation Act of 2002 H.R. 3966", Congressional 
Record, 14 March 2002, E353. 
24  A Bill to Limit The Issuance Of Patents On Medical Procedures, House of Representatives 112, 
104th Congress, 1st Session, 3 March 1995. 
25  Pallin v Singer(1995) 36 USPQ (2d) 1050; and S. Shulman, "The New Medical Licenses", in 
Owning The Future (Boston:  Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), 33-59. 
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States".26 The pair believed that the attempt to limit the rights available to a gene-patent 
holder was misguided.  Furthermore, they argue that the proposed study of the impact of 
gene patents is biased in its methodology.  At the time of writing, the complementary 
bills have been referred to the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual 
Property for further consideration and discussion. 
 
By contrast, in the European Union, the patent defence for experimental use has been 
broadly defined - including both non-commercial and commercial activities. 
 
Many European Union nations exempt from liability for patent infringement "acts done 
for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the patented invention".27 
Under present European Union law there are separate provisions which on the one hand 
exempt use which is private and non-commercial, and, on the other hand, experimental 
use.  In consequence courts across Europe have shown increased willingness to treat 
experimental research as exempt from patent liability even though it has a commercial 
purpose.28 However, there remain important limitations to the research exemption.  Most 
notably, the exemption does not include research using a patented research tool which is 
not itself the subject of the further experimentation.  Nor does it cover tests which merely 
replicate the invention.  Nevertheless, the United Kingdom Department Health inquiry 
into Intellectual Property and Health reports "While the evolving European position on 
the research exemption does give rise to ambiguities, at least it can be said that a more 
coherent dynamic prevails in Europe than in the US." 29 
 
In its recent discussion paper on Gene Patenting and Human Health, the Australian Law 
Reform Commission argued that researchers would benefit from the introduction of a 
                                                 
26  Seide, R. and LeCointe, M, "Two New Bills Present Challenges To DNA Patentability", 
GenomeWeb News, 24 June 2002. 
27 Article 27(b) of the Council Agreement relating to Community Patents No 89/695/EEC, 15 
December 1989, OJ L 401/01. 
28 For the UK, see Monsanto v.  Stauffer [1985] RPC 515.  For recent confirmation of the new 
approach in France, Wellcome Foundation v Parexel International & Flamel, Tribunal de Grande Instance 
de Paris, 20th February 2001: Intellectual Property News Issue 17, July 2001. 
29 Two decisions of the German Supreme Court treat clinical trials of pharmaceuticals as falling 
under the exception.   
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defence for experimental use into the Australian patent legislation.  It has advocated a 
broad-based defence of experimental use, in line with the European Union.   
 
This submission supports the ALRC recommendations in their discussion paper30. Rather 
than adopt the stringent US model of Madey v Duke University, Australia should follow 
the more liberal European model of a defence of experimental use.  
 
                                                 
30 Gene Patenting and Human Health, ALRC Discussion Paper 68, 2004, chapter 14.133. 
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Question 3: What are the constraints for an experimental use exemption (or possible 
alternatives) under any of the international agreements to which Australia is a signatory? 
 
It is axiomatic that any proposed new experimental or research use defence needs to be 
consistent with Australia’s international obligation.  
 
However, the defence of experimental use does not go beyond international norms and 
practices. The European Union and the United States of America have long recognized 
the defence of research exemption as a legitimate limited exception to the exclusivity of 
rights granted to the patent holder. By adopting the European model of experimental use, 
such a position is not constrained by multilateral agreements. It seems clear that the 
enactment of an experimental use defence into Australian law, covering acts done for 
experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the patented invention,31 would 
not conflict with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, as it would constitute an 
appropriately limited exception to patent rights. Nor, as it currently stands, would the 
Australia-US Free Trade Agreement impede the introduction of the laws based on the 
European laws on experimental use into Australian law. 
 
The amendment of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) to include new defences would be entirely 
consistent with Australia's obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement does note that "members may provide limited 
exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do 
not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the 
legitimate interests of third parties".  
 
The defences that have been mooted do not go beyond international norms and practices.  
The European Union and the United States of America have long recognised the defence 
                                                 
31 That is, consistent with United Kingdom law: Patents Act 1977 (UK) s 60(5)(b); and Council 
Agreement relating to Community Patents No 89/695/EEC, 15 December 1989, OJ L 401/01 art 27(b). 
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of research exemption as a legitimate limited exception to the exclusive rights conferred 
by a patent.  The United States of America developed the limited liability for medical 
practitioners in respect of patent infringement.  
 
Moreover, Article 27 (3) (a) provides that members may also exclude from patentabilility 
"diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans and animals".  
Furthermore, Article 27 (3)(b) stresses that members may also exclude from patentability 
plants and animals other than micro-organisms.  However, members must provide for the 
protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system.  Such 
qualifications suggest that the patent system can be specifically tailored to deal with life 
forms - such as plants, animals and humans.  Moreover, there would also be the 
opportunity to design special defences in such fields. 
 
Article 17.9.3 of the United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement provides that "each 
party may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, 
provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of third parties". 
 
This article echoes the language of the TRIPS Agreement.  It would be sufficiently broad 
to accommodate a research exemption modelled upon the broad defence of European 
Union.  This article of the United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement does not 
compel Australia to adopt the standard in Madey v Duke University.  Neither does it 
restrict the United States Congress from legislating to provide for a broader defence for 
experimental use than is currently provided in Madey v Duke University. 
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Question 4: Is there any empirical evidence that the balance between the incentives for 
innovation and the ability to use innovations, particularly for research and development, 
is being significantly affected by the absence of an explicit experimental use exemption 
(or some other provision) in Australian patent law? 
 
Strong empirical evidence exists to suggest that post-grant measures and incentives for 
innovation and the ability to use innovations for research and development is being 
affected by the absence of an explicit experimental use provision in Australian patent 
law. 
 
The controversy over Genetic Technology Limited’s patents with respect to non-coding 
DNA highlights problems with the lack of an experimental use defence.32 In May 2003, 
Genetic Technologies announced that the University of Utah had agreed to buy a research 
license to its non-coding patents for what it called a peppercorn fee - US$1,000. This in 
effect made null the unwritten assumption on the defence of experimental use. Chief 
Scientific Officer of Sequenom Inc, Dr Charles Cantor, compared the pressure pressed 
upon researchers from Genetic Technology Limited in Melbourne akin to “blackmail”33. 
Further, potential increases in license fees are not a viable option and would blow clinical 
and laboratory programs out of most science researchers budgets. Dr Mervyn Jacobson, 
founder and executive chairman of Genetic Technologies Limited in Melbourne sees no 
room for the exemption in the future of Australian patent law because, “Research these 
days, in general, is big business”.34 
 
Part of the controversy can be attributed to a lack of understanding of the scope of 
experimental use as a defence. Research conducted by Dr Dianne Nicol and Jane Nielsen 
confirms that many Australian researchers and research institutions harbour erroneous 
assumptions about the scope of an existing experimental or research use defence. They 
note that some respondents to their 2003 survey of research institutions "put forward the 
                                                 
32 “Patently a Problem” Interview by Jonathon Holmes, Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation, 8.30pm 11 August 2003. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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argument that all research as such is exempt, whether it is conducted in research 
institutions or private sector".35 Based on the survey results, Nicol and Nielsen looked at 
the scope of what they term the "practice-based research exemption’, that is, where the 
line is drawn between basic research, which is assumed to be exempt, and commercial 
research, about which there is no such assumption".36  
                                                 
35 See Nicol, D. and Nielsen, J. Patents and Medical Biotechnology: An Empirical Analysis of Issues 
Facing the Australian Industry (2003) Centre for Law and Genetics Occasional Paper No 6, 218. 
36 Ibid, 218. 
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Question 5: Are there any overwhelming arguments for consideration of pre-grant 
conditions for patents as a complement or alternative to an experimental use exemption 
under Australian law? 
 
There are arguments for the consideration of pre-grant considerations for patents as a 
complement to an experimental use exemption under Australian law. There remain 
problems with the application of patent criteria of novelty, inventive step and utility as 
highlighted by the Alphapharm case37. The Alphapharm case reinforces the need for a 
wider range of defences, such as experimental use.  
 
In Aktieboloaget Hassel v Alphapharm Pty Ltd, the majority of the High Court held that, 
in assessing whether or not the inventive step requirement has been satisfied, the issue is 
whether a notional research group in the field ‘would have been led directly as a matter of 
course to pursue one avenue in the expectation that it might well produce the [claimed 
compound]’. The Court found that the results of a ‘routine literature search’ that have not 
entered into the common general knowledge are not relevant to an assessment of 
inventiveness. Further, the Court stated that: "The tracing of a course of action which was 
complex and detailed, as well as laborious, with a good deal of trial and error, with dead 
ends and the retracing of steps is not the taking of routine steps to which a hypothetical 
formulator was taken as a matter of course."  
 
In the oral proceedings of the Alphapharm case, Justice Kirby argued that there was a 
need for the test of novelty and inventive step of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) to reflect the 
complexities of contemporary science: 
 
But the Act talks to science and invention at different stages. Its origins lie in earlier centuries and 
nowadays science, in the field of nuclear physics and the field of biology and in the field of 
informatics, has gone beyond the scope, immediate Eureka-type exclamations, it is more complex, 
and therefore, if the Act is to speak with relevance to science and technology as they exist today, 
the ultimate question that has to be addressed is whether in that moving context what is obvious 
moves with that change and therefore that with the advance of the availability of information, 
                                                 
37 Aktibolaget Hassle v Alphapharm Proprietary Limited [2002] HCA 59. 
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including through the Internet and so on, that you face up to the reality of that factual substratum 
to which the statute speaks.38 
 
Justice Kirby adds:  "I have read somewhere there are 160,000 patents outstanding, many 
of them computer generated in the field of genomics for determination by the European 
Patent Office and the United States Trademarks and Patents Office.  The policy would 
tend to favour, in the advance of science and technology, the need for real inventiveness 
and, as it were, a loosening up, if anything, of the 3M test, so that in contemporary 
science and technology you would re-express that test, perhaps in a slightly different 
way… to require really and truly inventiveness and to disqualify for any obviousness, 
softening the obvious, strengthening the inventiveness".39 
 
In his dissenting judgment in Aktiebolaget Hassle v Alphapharm Pty Limited, Justice 
Kirby maintains that there is a need to engage in a statutory interpretation of obviousness 
and inventive step. 
 
When a statute becomes encumbered in such a way as to obscure its operation and obfuscate the 
meaning of the simple words used (such as here, "obvious" and "inventive step"), it is time to 
return to basics. As was said long ago, in another area, courts must arrest the practice, common 
amongst lawyers, that introduces "lamentable and disgraceful technicalities". The Act is not set 
apart from the development of general principles for the interpretation of Australian statutes. True, 
it has ancient predecessors and a long history. It is concerned with large and valuable property 
interests. It is reasonable that parties should seek predictability in the operation of statutory 
language, drawn from judicial approaches to that language in the past. But in the end the duty of 
courts is owed not to judicial synonyms or lawyers' metaphors used to explain the language of the 
statutes. The duty is to the statutory language itself.  
 From time to time, specialist lawyers need to be brought back to such basic principles. 
Otherwise, they may take possession of provisions enacted by the Parliament and read them with 
spectacles focussed only on the glosses of decisional history. There is no justification for treating 
the Act differently from other federal statutes. I remain of the opinion that I stated in the context of 
another Act that has likewise become entangled in unnecessary decisional verbiage:  "It is hubris 
                                                 
38  Justice Kirby, Alphapharm transcripts, http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/disp.pl/au/other/hca/transcripts/2001/S287/1.html 
39  Justice Kirby, Alphapharm transcripts, http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/disp.pl/au/other/hca/transcripts/2001/S287/1.html 
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on the part of specialised lawyers to consider that 'their Act' is special and distinct from general 
movements in statutory construction which have been such a marked feature of our legal system in 
recent decades. The Act in question here is not different in this respect. It should be construed, like 
any other federal statute, to give effect to the ascertained purpose of the Parliament."  
 The role of the tests of novelty and obviousness in patent law has been described, 
correctly in my view, in this way: "One possibility whereby an unnecessary dead-weight loss 
could arise is if patent protection is granted for a non-innovative product or process. In this case 
society might incur a monopolistic welfare cost without obtaining a new product or process in 
return. This point alerts us to the fact that the tests of novelty and non-obviousness in the patent 
law fulfil the useful economic function of preventing undeserved monopoly profits. This potential 
misuse of monopoly rights must be prevented by strict application of the screening criteria in the 
patent law." 40 
 
Justice Kirby observes the key criteria by which the inventive step test should be applied: 
 
It is not diligence and determination or the input of time, labour, skill and effort or the expenditure 
of resources that meet the criteria in the Act.  Something more is needed.  And this, it seems to 
me, presents the substantive difference between the approach I favour, and that of other members 
of this Court. 
 As Mustill LJ puts it:  'If the criteria for patentability are pitched too low there is a risk 
that mere hard work or superiority of resources, or simple good luck, will entitle a researcher to a 
monopoly, the commercial and social justification for which is by no means, given the risk of 
stultifying the development of industry by open competition.41 
 
Justice McHugh makes similar comments:  "A judge trying the obviousness issue is not 
bound, as a matter of law, to determine that issue by reference to persons who are  not 
'particularly imaginative or inventive'.  Nor is the judge, in a case like the present, bound 
to ask 'whether the hypothetical addressee faced with the same problem would have taken 
as a matter of routine whatever steps might have led from the prior art to the invention, 
whether they be the steps of the inventor or not'.  Not is the judge bound to ask whether a 
notional research group would be directly led, as a matter of course, to try the approach 
of the 'inventor' in the expectation that it might well produce a useful result or 
alternative." 
                                                 
40  Aktiebolaget Hassle v Alphapharm Pty Limited [2002] HCA 59 
41  Aktiebolaget Hassle v Alphapharm Pty Limited [2002] HCA 59 
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The Federal Trade Commission report, "To Promote Innovation", provides a number of 
creative reform proposals with respect to novelty and inventive step in the United 
States.42  It recommends that Congress tighten legal standards to determine whether an 
invention is "obvious": 
 
It is important to protect against the issuance of obvious patents that may confer market power and 
unjustifiably raise costs. Requiring concrete suggestions beyond those actually needed by a person 
with ordinary skill in the art, and failing to give weight to suggestions implicit from the art as a 
whole and from the nature of the problem to be solved, is likely to result in patents on obvious 
inventions and is likely to be unnecessarily detrimental to competition. The Federal Circuit’s most 
recent articulations of the suggestion test seem to signal greater appreciation of these issues and 
would better facilitate implementation of the test in ways sensitive to competitive concerns.43 
 
The Federal Trade Commission urges that in assessing obviousness, the analysis should 
ascribe to the person having ordinary skill in the art an ability to combine or modify prior 
art references that is consistent with the creativity and problem-solving skills that in fact 
are characteristic of those having ordinary skill in the art.  Requiring concrete suggestions 
or motivations beyond those actually needed by a person of ordinary skill in the art, and 
failing to give weight to suggestions implicit from the prior art as a whole, suggestions 
from the nature of the problem to be solved, and the ability and knowledge of one of 
ordinary skill in the art, errs on the side of issuing patents on obvious inventions and is 
likely to be unnecessarily detrimental to competition. 
 
The Federal Trade Commission urges that in assessing obviousness, the analysis should 
ascribe to the person having ordinary skill in the art an ability to combine or modify prior 
art references that is consistent with the creativity and problem solving skills that in fact 
are characteristic of those having ordinary skill in the art.  Requiring concrete suggestions 
                                                 
42  Federal Trade Commission.  To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and 
Patent Law and Policy, A Report by the Federal Trade Commission, October 2003, 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf 
43  Federal Trade Commission.  To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and 
Patent Law and Policy, A Report by the Federal Trade Commission, October 2003, 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf 
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or motivations beyond those actually needed by a person of ordinary skill in the art, and 
failing to give weight to suggestions implicit from the prior art as a whole, suggestions 
from the nature of the problem to be solved, and the ability and knowledge of one of 
ordinary skill in the art, errs on the side of issuing patents on obvious inventions and is 
likely to be unnecessarily detrimental to competition. 
 
Accordingly, the Commonwealth should amend the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) to raise the 
standards of 'novelty' and 'inventive step' in light of the judgment of Justice Kirby in the 
Alphapharm case. 
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Question 6: Does fair dealing (or fair use) in copyright law hold any lessons for 
"experimental use" in Australian patent law? For example, could any of the provisions for 
fair dealing/use be translated into an experimental use provision in patent law? Or do 
differences in the nature and application of copyright and patent rights limit the analogies 
between the two systems? 
 
Some analogies can be drawn between experimental use exemptions for patents and the 
fair use provisions in copyright.  
 
In the United States, Donna Gitter observes: "Congress also should codify an 
experimental-use exemption for public-sector researchers at the federal level and 
nonprofit researchers".44 She notes:  "Such an exemption is appropriate for biotechnology 
research, especially research relating to homologous DNA sequences, since later 
inventions often contribute significant information about a particular sequence's function, 
thereby transforming scientists' understanding of that sequence".45 
 
Gitter argues that the defence of fair use in copyright law would be provide a useful 
model for a defence of experimental use.46   Section 107 provides: 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, 
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by 
that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In 
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be 
considered shall include -  
 
                                                 
44  Gitter, D.  "International Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences In The United States 
And The European Union:  An Argument For Compulsory Licensing And A Fair Use Exemption", New 
York University Law Review, 2001, Vol. 76, p. 1623.  See also Gilat, D.  Experimental Use And Patents 
1995; and Barash, E.  "Experimental Uses, Patents And Scientific Progress", North-Western University 
Law Review, 1997, Vol. 91, p. 667. 
45  Gitter, D.  "International Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences In The United States 
And The European Union:  An Argument For Compulsory Licensing And A Fair Use Exemption", New 
York University Law Review, 2001, Vol. 76, p. 1623. 
46  O'Rourke, M.  "Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use In Patent Law", Columbia Law Review, 2000, Vol. 
100 (5), p 1177. 
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(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or 
is for nonprofit educational purposes;  
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;  
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and  
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.  
 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made 
upon consideration of all the above factors 
 
The open-ended defence of fair use - with an inclusive list of protected activities and a 
list of relevant factors - would be a good model for the United States. 
 
Fair use turns on the degree to which the infringer has added substantial value to the 
original work and 'transformed' it in some way.47  In Campbell v Acuff-Rose, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the defence of fair use supported the transformative use of 
copyright material.48 Justice Souter comments: 
 
The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice Story’s words, whether the new work 
merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation, or instead adds something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it 
asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is ‘transformative.’  Although such 
transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to 
promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.  Such 
works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines 
of copyright, and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other 
factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.49 
 
The Supreme Court moved away from the past emphasis in fair use decisions upon the 
commercial nature of the use.  It specifically rejected the argument that Sony v Universal 
City Studios called for a presumption that every commercial use of copyrighted material 
                                                 
47  Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music (1994) 127 L Ed 2d 500. 
48 Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music (1994) 127 L Ed 2d 500. 
49 Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music (1994) 127 L Ed 2d 500. 
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was unfair.50  It claimed that the authority calls for "a sensitive balancing of interests", so 
that the commercial use of an activity was weighed along with other factors in fair use 
decisions.51 
 
The notion of "transformative use" might be useful in delimiting the scope of 
experimental use. 
                                                 
50 Sony Corporation Of America, et al. v University City Studios Inc. (1984) 78 L Ed 2d 574. 
51 Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music (1994) 127 L Ed 2d 500. 
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Question 7: Do basic, applied or hybrid research have different needs with respect to the 
patent system? If so, how can the patent system accommodate these differences? 
 
Although the use of hybrid motivation may be useful to characterise research in the field 
of biomedical sciences and in other areas, the extent to which research for academic, 
industrial and commercial purposes overlap means that such categorisations of basic, 
applied or hybrid research do not provide a useful schema to assess changes to the patent 
system for the purpose of making explicit an experimental use defence. 
 
Question 8: Is there any evidence for a "patent thicket" or "tragedy of the anti-commons" 
problem in research and development? If so, what are the issues/effects? 
 
Strong empirical evidence exists to support that the current patent system in Australia is 
creating the growth of patent thickets which generates the, so-called “tragedy of anti 
commons”52. Contrary to the Bendekgey and Hamlet-Cox study, this has resulted in the 
under-use of patents and thus decline in investment in patents as well as research 
innovation in Australia.53  
                                                 
52 Heller, M. and Eisenberg, R.  "Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research", Science, 1 May 1998, Vol. 280, p. 698 www.sciencemag.org. 
53 Merz, J. Diagnostic Testing Fails theTest Nature vol. 415 (2002), p. 577. Also, “Patently a 
Problem” Interview by Jonathon Holmes, Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 8.30pm 11 
August 2003. 
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Question 9: Does biotechnology, and genetic technology in particular, have special 
issues that warrant special treatment under patent law with respect to experimental use? 
 
Biological inventions and gene patents do present issues that warrant special treatment 
under patent law in repect to experimental use.  The Australian Law Reform Commission 
suggests that experimentation on patented genetic materials aimed at discovering another 
function of a genetic sequence or its interrelation with another genetic sequence should 
generally be covered by such a defence.  The defence of experimental use should also 
extend to experimentation or research on the patented gene aimed at improving the 
invention. This approach is consistent with the views of Professor Rebecca Eisenberg, 
who suggested that the proper scope of an experimental use defence should include 
research ‘in the field of the invention, which could potentially lead to improvements in 
the patented technology or to the development of alternative means of achieving the same 
purpose’.54 
                                                 
54 Eisenberg, R. "Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use" 
(1989) 56 University of Chicago Law Review 1017, 1078. Also Rai, A. "Regulating Scientific Research: 
Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science" (1999) 94 Northwestern University Law Review 77, 
139.  
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Question 10: What is the justification for an experimental use exemption? 
Question 11: Is a criterion based upon whether the experimentation is on the invention 
itself as opposed to experimenting with an invention for its intended purpose (use) a 
useful criterion for determining "experimental use" in Australian patent law? 
Question 12: If so, is it sufficient by itself? 
Question 13: Should an experimental use exemption cover only the situation where 
experimentation is the sole purpose of the use of the invention? 
Question 14: If not, what are alternatives or supplementary criteria for an experimental 
use exemption? 
 
The justification for an experimental use exemption anunciated by the ALRC in their 
discussion paper is premised on the duty of disclosure of the patent holder. The 
compensation for disclosure is the payment of royalities. An experimental use defence 
may be seen as a going one step further than the disclosure requirement. While the 
disclosure of the innovation is made to the public, the defence of experimental use is 
likely to be limited to people within similar scientific and technological fields and 
academia, who may wish to comment or to use this inventive step to undertake further 
research or experimentation. This process allows for the development of new or 
improved inventions which is a fundamental tenet of the patent system.Without recourse 
to the experiment exemption researchers would be allowed only to read about the 
patented invention, without being able to experiment with the invention to see if and how 
it works.55 
 
The trend in modern European law offers useful criteria for determining “experimental 
use” in Australian patent law. Following the ALRC’s recommendations the list of  
criterion may include: 
                                                 
55 Australian Law Reform Commission.  Gene Patenting and Human Health. Discussion Paper 68.  
Sydney:  Australian Law Reform Commission, February 2004. Canada: Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products: Complaint by the European Communities and their Member States, 17 March 
2000, WT/DS114/R, 56. See also Sampson, T.  "Madey, Integra and the Wealth of Nations" (2004) 26 
European Intellectual Property Review 1.  
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• experimentation on a patented invention and research involving the use of a 
patented invention;  
• the purpose or intention of experimentation or research, in terms of its technical, 
scientific or commercial motivations;  
• the technical, scientific or commercial outcomes of experimentation or research; 
or  
• the nature of the organisation conducting the experimentation or research, for 
example whether the organisation is a commercial or not-for-profit entity.56 
The key element of a defence of experimental use should be that the requisite relationship 
between the experimentation or research and the patented invention exists. That is, that 
experimentation is on a patented invention or that research involves the use of a patented 
invention. However, experimentation to gain further knowledge about the patented 
invention and its uses should be covered. 
In support of the Australian Law Reform Commission recommendations, under an 
experimental use defence, the following acts should not constitute patent infringement:  
(a) testing an invention to determine its sufficiency or to compare it to prior art;  
(b) tests to determine how the patented invention worked; 
(c) experimentation on a patented invention for the purpose of improving on it or 
developing a further patentable invention;  
(d) experimentation for the purpose of ‘designing around’ a patented invention;  
(e) testing to determine whether the invention met the tester’s purposes in 
anticipation of requesting a licence; and  
(f) academic instructional experimentation with the invention.57 
                                                 
56 Australian Law Reform Commission.  Gene Patenting and Human Health. Discussion Paper 68.  
Sydney:  Australian Law Reform Commission, February 2004.  
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Question 15: Are improved licensing practices by research organisations a whole or 
partial alternative to an experimental use exemption in Australia? 
Question 16: If so, how could licensing practices be improved to provide better outcomes 
for researchers? 
 
Recognising the importance for protecting, developing and commercialising knowledge 
and research resources, seven agencies58 worked together to develop “…a consistent 
national framework for the management and exploitation of intellectual property (IP) 
generated by publicly funded research.”59 
 
The nine principles were developed in order:  "…to assist researchers, research manager 
and their research institutions, in ensuring that they have access to best practice for the 
identification, protection and management of IP, and therefore, to maximise the national 
benefits and returns from public investment in research.60 
The principles are expected to evolve over time and cover: 
 
• the importance of having and IP policy;  
• identification, protection and ownership of IP;  
• assessment and management of IP;  
• importance of sharing benefits and recognising the rights and needs of all 
stakeholders in the exploitation of IP; and 
• transparency, reporting and potential conflict of interest issues.  
 
Commercialisation of outcomes is viewed as requiring a case-by-case approach and is left 
for the individual institutions and organisations to define.  
                                                                                                                                                 
57 Ibid. Also, Statement of Legislative History of Title V of Patent Competitiveness and 
Technological Innovation Bill 1990 (US) in H Wegner, Patent Law in Biotechnology, Chemicals & 
Pharmaceuticals (2nd ed, 1994), 465. 
58 The seven agencies were - The Australian Research Council; The Australian Tertiary  Institutions 
Commercial Companies Association; The Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee; The Department of 
Education, Training and Youth Affairs; The Department of Industry, Science and Resources; IP Australia; 
and The National Health and Medical Research Council.  
59 National Principles of Intellectual Property Management for Publicly Funded Research. 
60 Ibid   
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It is noteworthy that the Australian Research Council (ARC) and the National Health and 
Medical Research Council (NHMRC) stated that they “…do not wish to hold a stake in 
direct ownership of IP nor do they intend to benefit directly from commercial outcomes 
of the research funded through their financial support.”61  
 
Arguably, though, there is need for greater government regulations on intellectual 
property management in respect of collaborations between the private sector and the 
public sector. 
 
In an article in Law and Contemporary Problems, Rebecca Eisenberg and Arti Rai 
comment upon the nature of technology transfer under the Bayh-Dole Act: 
 
Under the Bayh-Dole Act, determinations of what to patent are assigned in the first instance to the 
institution receiving federal research funds--typically a university in the case of NIH-sponsored 
biomedical research. Universities, in turn, have delegated this task to technology transfer 
professionals who are charged with building patent portfolios that will bring in revenue to the 
university.  If the university declines to pursue patent rights on a particular invention, the 
sponsoring agency may claim ownership.  If neither institution wants to patent the invention, the 
investigator may do so.  In other words, if anyone involved in the research--the grantee, the 
sponsor, or the investigator--thinks the invention is worth patenting, that party may prevail over 
anyone who believes the invention should be left in the public domain.  As noted earlier, the 
research sponsor may vary these rules in the terms of a funding agreement only in "exceptional 
circumstances," and only by complying with burdensome procedural safeguards.62 
 
Eisenberg and Rai argue that "the decision of Congress to divest funding agencies of any 
significant discretion to restrict patenting makes much less sense than it did in 1980".63 
 
Eisenberg and Rai comment upon the creative role played by the National Institutes of 
Health in relation to access to intellectual property 
                                                 
61 Ibid  
62  Rai, A. and Eisenberg, R.  "Bayh - Doyle Reform And The Progress Of Biomedicine", Law And 
Contemporary Problems, 2003, Vol. 66, p. 289. 
63  Ibid. 
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Left to their own devices, universities may be unable to take sustained collective action in favor of 
the public domain.  For this reason, the role of NIH is crucial.  On a number of occasions, NIH has 
been able to use hortatory strategies to convince academic institutions to act collectively to keep 
basic research information in the public domain.  For example, leaders of the National Human 
Genome Research Institute ("NHGRI"), together with the Wellcome Trust and academic 
researchers at the major human genome mapping centers, resolved in February 1996 that "all 
human genomic DNA sequence information generated by centers funded for large-scale human 
sequencing should be freely available and in the public domain in order to encourage research and 
development." …  NIH undertook a similar strategy for SNPs… The hortatory efforts of NIH to 
constrain its grantees in pursuing intellectual property rights have not been limited to genome-
related projects. A more general statement of "Principles and Guidelines for Sharing of 
Biomedical Research Resources," adopted by NIH in December 1999, also attempts to guide NIH 
grantees in the deployment of their proprietary rights…  The goals that NIH has sought to promote 
through these various hortatory statements are broadly consistent with the stated goal of the Bayh-
Dole Act: "[T]o promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or 
development." 64 
 
Nonetheless, the authors are concerned that the National Institutes of Health has acted 
outside the scope of its statutory authority, however, at least with respect to patentable 
inventions, leaving itself vulnerable to a potential legal challenge from a recalcitrant 
grantee.   Furthermore, they observe:  "But there is growing evidence that NIH may 
require authority beyond the bully pulpit to ensure continuing compliance with these 
norms in the future.  Consider, for example, the recent controversy over the broad patent 
held by WARF on primate embryonic stem cells."65 
 
Eisenberg and Rai comment that universities are poor guardians of intellectual property 
because the immediate gain to be realised from patenting may outweigh the more distant 
possibility of gain from a university wide regime of collective self-restraint: 
 
Universities face a very significant collective action problem, and traditional norms of open 
exchange may no longer be sufficiently robust to address this problem. The obstacle to relying 
                                                 
64  Ibid. 
65  Ibid. 
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solely on universities is particularly large because the primary remaining adherents to open 
science norms, individual research scientists, do not necessarily make the ultimate decisions about 
university patenting.66 
 
The authors conclude argue that funding agencies should have greater discretion in 
imposing restrictions on patenting by the recipients of government funding:  "We believe 
that the time is ripe to alter the Bayh-Dole Act to give funding agencies more latitude in 
guiding patenting and licensing activities of their grantees".67 
 
Similarly, in the Report on Intellectual Property Rights and Genetics, the authors submit 
that the United Kingdom Department of Health needs to play a more active role in 
relation to gene patents:  "The Department needs to develop a coherent policy for both 
the receipt and the provision of patented material".68  It notes that it is clear that the 
Department of Health will be directly affected by the patenting of genetic material.  The 
impact of these patents will be twofold.  The Department will stand as a receiver of 
patented products and processes.  It could also stand as provider of patented products and 
processes developed by NHS trusts.  
 
The report recommends that the Department of Health should recognise its unique 
position with regard to healthcare related intellectual property and take an active role in 
monitoring developments in relevant areas of intellectual property law (most notably 
patent law).  It should, as provider and recipient of intellectual property, support the 
appropriate use of intellectual property law, and in particular patent law, in protecting 
inventions involving genetic material. 
 
In light of the ongoing advancements in bioscience and difficulties in establishing and 
maintaining concrete distinctions between types of genetic innovation, it should focus its 
                                                 
66  Rai, A. and Eisenberg, R.  "The Public And The Private In Biopharmaceutical Research", 
Conference on the Public Domain, the Center for the Public Domain, Duke University, 9-11 November 
2001.  
67  Ibid. 
68  Cornish, W., Llewellyn, M. and Adcock, M.  Intellectual Property Rights And Genetics: A Study 
into the Impact and Management of Intellectual Property Rights within the Healthcare Sector.  Cambridge:  
Public Health Unit, 2003. 
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attention not on the type of material being patented but on the way in which the UK 
Patent Office applies the new guidelines to applications involving biological material, 
and on equivalent decisions in the EPO and should also endorse the position taken by the 
Nuffield Council regarding the application of the granting criteria. 
 
It should have in place a mechanism for assessing:  
 
(i) Whether to send information to the EPO or UKPO during the examination of a 
patent application which would restrict the scope of any patent on the disclosed genetic 
invention 
 
(ii) Whether to challenge the validity of a genetic patent once granted, either in the 
UK before the Comptroller of Patents or in court; or (for a European patent) by 
opposition proceedings in the EPO (commenced within 9 months of grant) 
 
(iii) Whether to challenge any abuse of monopoly in the manner in which a patentee 
exploits his rights by referring the matter to the UK Office of Fair Trading or the EC 
Competition Directorate. 
 
The report recommends that the Department of Health should instigate a robust central 
policy for “licensing in” designed to moderate excessive demands by licensors by 
considering, as possible options, the use of compulsory licensing, competition law and 
Crown use.  It should adopt a balanced approach for “licensing out”, particularly over the 
question of exclusivity, and where appropriate the Department should provide model 
agreements for use by hubs and Trusts.  
 
The report concludes:  "The action taken by the Ontario Government and the Dutch 
Government in respect of the Myriad Genetics patent would indicate that a strong 
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government line would be by no means unprecedented.  Furthermore, The Curie Institute 
in France is leading the opposition to Myriad BRCA patents at the EPO69." 
 
Arguably, Australian funding agencies should follow the lead of the National Institutes of 
Health, and the United Kingdom department of Health, and play a much more active role 
in intellectual property management, policy, and litigation. 
                                                 
69 The Institute is part of a coalition of 17 French research and clinical agencies, challenging the 
impact of the BRCA 1 patent through the European Patent Office.  
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Question 17: In what fields are patent pools a realistic whole or partial alternative to an 
experimental use exemption in Australia? 
Question 18: Are the potential benefits of patent pools likely to outweigh their potential 
disadvantages? 
 
The Australian Law Reform Commission has considered whether patent pools, patent 
clearinghouses or collective rights organisations might also help address difficulties in 
obtaining access to patented genetic materials and technologies.70  Members of the 
United States Patent and Trade Mark Office have published a paper on whether patent 
pools are a solution to the problem of access in respect of biotechnology patents.71  They 
define a “patent pool” as an "agreement between two or more patent owners to license 
one or more of their patents to one another or third parties".72   David Resnik is a 
champion of such a scheme:  "Industry leaders and scientists could choose the path of 
enlightened self-interest by forming a biotechnology patent pool".73 
 
The Commission recognised that "some participants in the Australian biotechnology 
sector may find the negotiation of patent licences to be problematic".74  The law reform 
body, though, was not inclined to make proposals specifically aimed at regulating gene 
patenting licensing practices.  It recommended that such matters should be taken up by an 
industry body:  "The ALRC believes that a representative industry body should consider 
the feasibility of establishing patent pools or patent clearinghouses over particular types 
of patented genetic materials or technologies".75 
 
                                                 
70  Australian Law Reform Commission.  Gene Patenting and Human Health. Discussion Paper 68.  
Sydney:  Australian Law Reform Commission, February 2004., p. 634. 
71  Clark, J. et al.  "Patent Pools: A  Solution To The Problem Of Access In Biotechnology Patents", 
United States Patent And Trade Mark Office, 5 December 2000, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patentpool.pdf 
72  Ibid. 
73  Resnik, D.  "A Biotechnology Patent Pool:  An Idea Whose Time Has Come?", The Journal Of 
Philosophy, Science And Law, January 2003, Vol. 3, 
http://www.psljournal.com/archives/papers/biotechpatent.cfm  
74  Australian Law Reform Commission.  Gene Patenting and Human Health.  Discussion Paper 68.  
Sydney:  Australian Law Reform Commission, February 2004, p. 639. 
75  Id, p. 641. 
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There was some debate in the inquiry as to whether patent pools could have anti-
competitive effects in the marketplace.  The Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission submitted: "While pooling and cross-licensing can be pro-competitive, there 
is also the potential for arrangements to be used for blatant price fixing, or marketing 
sharing, agreements among competitors without any possible pro-competitive 
justification".76  It suggested that patent pools would be less likely to raise competition 
concerns if they combined complementary patents, did not restrict access to the 
technology by third parties, and did not facilitate the sharing of commercially sensitive 
information of competitors in downstream markets. 
 
Patent pooling is not a suitable alternative to a research exemption because the use of the 
patent is limited to members of the pool.  By contrast, the defence of experimental use is 
available to conceivably the whole public - whether or not they are a member of a pool. 
                                                 
76  Id, p. 670. 
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Question 19: Is compulsory licensing a realistic whole or partial alternative to an 
experimental use exemption in Australia? 
Question 20: For this to happen, do Australia's compulsory licensing provisions need to 
be changed?  If so, how? 
 
In its present form in Australia, compulsory licensing provisions are both cumbersome 
and unwieldy and have not yet been invoked. If compulsory licensing is to be able to 
offer any meaningful supplement to the defence of experimental use then there needs to 
be legislative reform. 
 
Compulsory licensing and forfeiture were intended to address a concern that foreign 
patent owners might limit domestic prosperity by hindering domestic manufacture and 
industry development while at the same time extracting monopoly profits.77 Promoting 
domestic industry and development may no longer be imperatives,78 but compulsory 
licensing and forfeiture provide potentially useful tools to implement competition 
objectives where the patentee seeks to impose high prices and restrict access.  
 
Section 133 of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) provides a ‘person’ may apply for a 
compulsory license to be made by a ‘prescribed court’79 three years after the grant of a 
patent80 where ‘the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented 
invention have not been satisfied’ and ‘the patentee has given no satisfactory reason for 
failing to exploit the patent’. Where a compulsory license has been granted s 134 
provides ‘an interested person’ may apply to have the patent forfeited for the same 
reasons. Section 135 defines the ‘reasonable requirements of the public’ to be unfair 
prejudice to an existing or potential Australian industry or demand for the patented 
product or process has not been met in Australia, that trade or industry in Australia is 
                                                 
77  Industrial Property Advisory Committee, Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia 
(1984), 28. 
78  Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Review of Intellectual Property 
Legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement (2000), 162. 
79  The ‘prescribed court’ in this instance is the Federal Court as the regulations do not provide for a 
court and Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 154(1) provides: ‘The Federal Court has jurisdiction with respect to 
matters arising under this Act’. 
80  Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth) r 12.1(1). 
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unfairly prejudiced by conditions attached by the patentee or that the patent is not being 
commercially worked in Australia. 
 
Menzies J of the High Court in Fastening Supplies Pty Ltd v Olin Mathieson Chemical 
Corporation81 considered a similar provision to the current s 135 of the Patents Act 1990 
(Cth) in s 110 of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth) and stated that: 
 
[T]he demand for the patented article has not been reasonably met if the court should be satisfied 
that, because of its superiority over articles already on the market, potential purchasers would have 
bought it had it been available. A market for a less efficient article indicates, other things being 
equal, a market for a more efficient article’.82  
 
In that case, the petitioner imported the patented improved captive bolt tool whereupon 
the patentee requested the petitioner cease and account for the tools already sold. The 
petitioner attempted to enter a licensing agreement but was refused as an exclusive 
licensing arrangement already existed and the licensee would not sub-license. At the time 
of the petition, the tool was not available to the public in Australia even though it was 
being manufactured overseas. Menzies J considered this was evidence that the reasonable 
requirements of the public had not been satisfied at the date of the petition.83 However, at 
the hearing there was evidence that the exclusive licensee in Australia had good reasons 
for failing to supply the tool to the public. Further, he had acted reasonably in attempting 
to develop a tool to be profitably manufactured in Australia and that this was not a 
belated response to the petition.84 Menzies J also considered the petitioner would be an 
unsuitable company to work the invention in Australia.85 The application to grant a 
compulsory license was therefore refused.86  
 
The present s 135 is constructed more broadly that s 110 of the 1952 Act and might be 
interpreted differently, with a focus on competition principles. In these circumstances the 
                                                 
81  (1969) 119 CLR 572. 
82  Ibid 575; the market was to be determined at the time of the hearing. 
83  Ibid 578-79. 
84  Ibid 579-82. 
85  Ibid 583. 
86  Ibid 583. 
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term ‘trade’ might be expected to have a very broad meaning and include every 
commercial or business transaction as well as non-arm’s length dealings outside the main 
stream of ordinary commercial activities and without a dominant purpose of profit 
making.87 The terms ‘unfairly prejudiced’, ‘reasonable terms’ and ‘reasonable extent’ 
require an interpretation that should also promote competition principles. However, 
despite the apparently broad application of these provisions, and in particular the 
definition of the ‘reasonable requirements of the public’, they have not been relied on to 
any extent in Australia.88 This might be because they are either (a) too restrictive – too 
difficult to prove, hedged with qualifications and discretion and too expensive to seek, or 
(b) very effective – inducing patentees to license in fear of a compulsory license and 
forfeiture.89  
 
In reviewing the patent system in 1984, the Industrial Property Advisory Committee 
recommended additional discretionary powers for courts to order compulsory licenses as 
a competition law remedy where the patent related conduct breached Part IV of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth).90 This recommendation extended to including the transfer of 
know-how together with the patent as a reasonable license term, and that such licenses 
should allow importation of the patented product or process.91 The recent Intellectual 
Property and Competition Review Committee recommended replacing s 135 with a series 
of conditions that if satisfied would require the order of a compulsory license.92 These 
conditions include that access to the patented invention is required for competition in a 
relevant market, that there is a public interest in enhanced competition, that the 
reasonable requirements for access have not been met and that the order would not 
                                                 
87  Re Ku-ring-gai Co-operative Building Society (No 12) Ltd (1978) 36 FLR 134, 139 (Bowen CJ); 
167 (Deane J). 
88  The only reported cases are Fastening Supplies Pty Ltd v Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 
above n 124 and Wissen Pty Ltd v Lown (1987) 9 IPR 124. 
89  Industrial Property Advisory Committee, Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia 
(1984), 28; and Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Review of Intellectual Property 
Legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement (2000), 162. 
90  Industrial Property Advisory Committee, Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia (1984) 
27-32. 
91  Ibid 32-33. 
92  Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Review of Intellectual Property 
Legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement (2000), 163. 
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compromise the legitimate interests of the patent owner.93 In applying these conditions 
the Australian Competition Tribunal was cited for its expertise in applying Part IIIA of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and perhaps suggesting the principles applied in Part 
IIIA might be relevant in assessing the need for a compulsory license.94 There was no 
other indication of how the broad terms of the conditions might be interpreted, although 
the Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee did consider the 
requirement for competition in a relevant market would mean there was no other option 
for competition in that market.95 
 
Compulsory licenses are potentially the most convenient and effective way to deal with 
the failings in applying the existing competition elements of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). 
Article 31 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights96 
(TRIPs) makes express provision for compulsory licensing (or rather, ‘other use without 
authorisation of the right holder’) as forming part of the minimum standard patent 
legislation for World Trade Organisation member states. The pre-conditions specified by 
TRIPs for the grant of a compulsory license are onerous and only follow the failure of the 
patentee to authorise use on reasonable terms and conditions within a reasonable time 
(except in national emergencies). There is also express recognition that compulsory 
licenses are a remedy in any judicial assessment of anti-competitive conduct, and it seems 
likely this provision would extend to include a suitable remedy following a finding of 
conduct in breach of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). However, there are substantial 
difficulties in assessing a reasonable royalty and exactly what circumstances merit a 
compulsory license. Finkelstein J’s assessment that a compulsory license was 
‘cumbersome and expensive to apply’97 identifies what is probably its biggest 
disadvantage as a remedy for an anti-competitive patent. Further, the terms and royalty to 
be paid for the compulsory license should not be under estimated because of the potential 
                                                 
93  Ibid 163. 
94  Ibid. 
95  Ibid. 
96  Part of ‘The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations’ signed by ministers at Marrakech on 15 April 1994 and came into force on 1 January 1995. 
This agreement formed part of the trade negotiations started in Punta del Este, Uruguay in September 1986 
that created the World Trade Organisation. 
97  Bristol-Myers Squibb v FH Faulding & Co Ltd, above n 59, 568. 
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for trade sanctions and retaliation according to the dispute settlement procedures forming 
part of TRIPs. 
 
Perhaps a more fruitful area to consider is the exceptions detailed in Arts 7, 8, 30 and 40 
which expressly recognise that domestic laws may deal with promoting innovation, 
technology transfer, remedy anti-competitive practices and regulate intellectual property 
which adversely affects trade or impedes technology transfer. Further, the recent decision 
by the World Trade Organisation in Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical 
Products98 established the potential of domestic patent laws to implement measures to 
resolve the potentially damaging effects of patenting and promote competition.99 
 
The Commonwealth should amend the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) to clarify the test for the 
grant of a compulsory licence. It should clarify the circumstances in which the 
‘reasonable requirements of the public’ will not have been satisfied.  It should specify 
that s 135 is not an exhaustive list of the circumstances in which a patented invention 
would fail to satisfy the ‘reasonable requirements of the public’. 
 
The Commonwealth should amend the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) to insert the competition-
based test that was recommended by the Intellectual Property and Competition Review 
Committee as an additional ground for the grant of a compulsory licence. The 
amendment should also provide for an independent review of the operation of the 
compulsory licensing provisions in addressing competition concerns arising in relation to 
patented inventions. This review should be conducted five years after the new test 
commences operation. 
 
The Patents Act 1990 (Cth) should be amended to allow a compulsory licence to be 
granted to a patent holder who cannot work his or her patent without using another patent 
for which authorised use cannot be obtained. 
                                                 
98  WT/DS/114 (17 March 2000). 
99  Review in Lawson, L. ‘Canada v European Union – Competition and Patents at the WTO’ (2000) 
28 ACCC Journal 1. 
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Question 21: Are open source principles a realistic whole or partial alternative to an 
experimental use exemption in Australia? 
Question 22: Are the potential benefits of open source likely to outweigh their potential 
disadvantages? 
 
The Commonwealth and its relevant funding agencies should provide support for open 
source projects to help promote access to genetic databases and scientific information.  
Although not a substitute for a research exemption, such projects will help the 
dissemination of genetic information and biological inventions. 
 
The free software foundation100  and the open source movement101  have been a source of 
inspiration to public researchers involved in the human genome project.  Many 
researchers have been keen to ensure that scientific information and biological software 
remains in the public domain through the use of creative contracts.  They have sought to 
live up to the impression that the scientific community is completely open and a place 
where ideas are shared freely. There are several main clusters of groups within the 
bioinformatics open source software community. 
 
The first group concerns the Ensembl project.  It consists of computer programs for 
genome analysis and the public database of human DNA sequences. Ensembl is a joint 
project which is being run by the Sanger Center, the U.K. partner in the publicly funded 
Human Genome Project (HGP) consortium, and the European Bioinformatics Institute 
(EBI).  It is funded by the medical welfare charity, the Wellcome Trust. 
 
                                                 
100  Moody, G. Rebel Code:  Linus Torvalds, Open Source, and the War for the Soul of Software. 
London: Penguin Books,  2001, p 26-27. 
101  Raymond, E.  The Cathedral and the Bazaar:  Musings on Linux and Open Source by an 
Accidental Revolutionary.  Cambridge, Mass.:  O'Reilly and Associates, 1999; Wayner, P.  Free For All:  
How Linux and the Free Software Movement Undercut the High-Tech Titans.  New York:  Harper 
Business, 2000; and Moody, G. Rebel Code:  Linus Torvalds, Open Source, and the War for the Soul of 
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At the CODE conference at Cambridge University, Tim Hubbard from the Sanger spoke 
about Ensembl and the Human Genome Project.102 He stressed the problems in 
distributing and integrating data about the human genome - namely, that while biological 
sequence data has been doubling every six months, computer speeds are doubling every 
eighteen months.  Tim Hubbard believes that Ensembl is a means of making the project 
of genomics 'democratic' so that people can contribute information and share it 
effectively: 
 
 Something like the human genome is too complicated for any person, any group, any company, to 
have a monopoly on knowledge. On the other hand, if every organisation puts up on a web-site 
what they think is on the human genome, you have a terrible mess in terms of people trying to 
understand, comparing one website to another website. So the approach of this open software 
project is to be as open as possible. Very standard things - open CDS repository; open database; 
open discussion; everyone can get the software; everyone can do similar bits of work with similar 
interfaces. That does not address the overlapping of the annotation.103 
 
The Ensembl Project is working on client server development.  It hopes to ensure that 
users can participate in the annotation of the human genome, in a democratic and 
constructive fashion. 
 
The Ensembl project seeks to overcome problems of inter-operability in the field of 
bioinformatics. They are larger, industry-focused organisations forming within the 
community who seek to shape the direction of many of the standards for interoperability.  
Brown and others comment that there are many obstacles to interoperability, not least the 
historical development of the sector: 
 
Bioinformatics systems were originally developed by relatively isolated research groups in 
response to local information handling problems.  Established research groups have consequently 
exhibited a reluctance to part with their locally developed systems and their preferred vocabularies 
and terms of reference for compounds and genes.  The degree of flexibility and openness to 
change by such actors is likely to be limited because of the financial cost of reorganising 
                                                 
102  Hubbard, T. "Ensembl And The Human Genome Project", CODE Conference, Friday 6 April 
2001. 
103  Ibid. 
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nomenclatures and data handling systems.  If cross matching between data bases is to be as 
automated as is hoped, these difficulties have to be overcome.104 
 
Brown and others seize upon a remark by a public database provider that the private 
sector secured its market by using incompatibility (interoperability) as a main asset.105  
To the question whether interoperability is a technical problem or not, this respondent 
answered:  "Linux, Emboss and other free and open projects clearly demonstrate that the 
problem is NOT technical, nor is it expenses.  But just merely unwillingness of private 
companies to allow free competition".106  Others claimed commercial soft-ware changed 
its data format so that interoperability would be reduced.  For public databases this means 
buying new software might take up a rather large part of their budgets. 
 
The second group is the Bioinformatics.org and the Open Lab.  This group offers web 
hosting and project support for a large set of projects relating to bioinformatics.  The 
projects within the Open Lab are primarily end-user software tools for scientists looking 
to solve particular biological and bioinformatics problems. Bioinformatics.org are 
concerned that bioinformatics software has been extremely restrictive, with licenses 
reaching millions of dollars per institution.  Third, the organisation campaigns against 
any notion of ownership of biological information and will work to develop a public or 
open licensing plan for information that has already been patented: 
 
When genomics companies patent natural (not engineered) products, such as human genes, they 
act like prospectors or gold-diggers. They claim ownership of that which they haven't invented or 
produced: biological information. And they cannot purchase it from anyone who has. This was 
made very clear as companies filed patents on tens of thousands of human genes during the 
Human Genome Sequencing Initiative. Some companies went as far as to write software that 
automatically printed a patent application for each gene found.107 
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Bioinformatics.org is interested in the use of licensing and compulsory licensing to gain 
access to inventions, which has already been patented. 
 
The third group is the Open Bioinformatics Foundation.  Its purpose is to act as an 
umbrella organisation for a handful of projects called the bio projects. This group creates 
development libraries and tools for programmers in a variety of languages for 
bioinformatics generally, but mainly to facilitate sequence management and analysis.  
These projects grew out of the original BioPerl project.  The goal of the foundation is to 
provide financial, administrative, and technical assistance for open source life science 
projects.  Sun Microsystems awarded a hardware grant in support of the Open 
Bioinformatics Foundation. 
 
The fourth group is the Public Library of Science. This organisation is concerned that 
access to scientific information has been restricted to those who hold expensive 
subscriptions.  It has circulated a letter proposing a boycott, beginning in September 
2001, of journals that do not provide "unrestricted free distribution rights to any and all 
original research reports ... within six months of their initial publication date".108 They 
believe that the record of scientific research and ideas should neither be owned nor 
controlled by publishers, but should belong to the public, and should be freely available 
through an international online public library. The Public Library of Science has seized 
upon the strategies of open source software: 
 
We have had extensive discussions with scientists, publishers and copyright experts about how 
authors who want to make their work freely accessible and useable can accomplish this while 
ensuring that they receive proper credit for their work. We have concluded that the best way to do 
this is for the authors and/or publishers to retain copyright on the work, but to irrevocably license 
the work to the public domain subject to the condition that proper attribution be given whenever 
the work is reproduced or redistributed. This practice is analogous to the way in which open 
source software is produced. By retaining copyright, authors and/or their representatives retain the 
right to enforce the terms of the license, but not the right to dictate how or by whom the work is 
used. 109 
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Establishment of this public library would vastly increase the accessibility and utility of 
the scientific literature, enhance scientific productivity, and catalyse integration of the 
disparate communities of knowledge and ideas in biomedical sciences.  The Public 
Library of Science has established two journals - one in Biology and the other in 
Medicine.  It relies upon Creative Commons licences to keep the work in the public 
domain. 
 
The Commonwealth should explore the development of open source projects in relation 
to human genetic databases to encourage access to scientific information. 
 
